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I. INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH the purposes served by the antitrust laws and the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
I("DTPA") 1 are complementary, they are not identical. The ob-
jective underlying the antitrust laws is protecting competition. 2 In con-
trast, the DTPA is intended "to protect consumers against false,
misleading and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and
breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures
to secure such protection."
'3
The shared concern, nevertheless, of both antitrust law and the DTPA,
is the consumer. The United States Supreme Court has described the
antitrust laws as a "consumer welfare prescription,"'4 and the lower courts
have echoed this principle, recognizing that "[u]ltimately, the consumer is
the beneficiary." 5 An additional connection is found in the DTPA's gen-
esis. The statute is modeled on the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTC Act"); indeed, the DTPA provides that "[i]t is the intent of the
legislature that in construing Subsection (a) of this section . . . the courts
to the extent possible will be guided by ... the interpretations given by
the Federal Trade Commission and federal courts to Section 5(a)(1)of the
Federal Trade Commission Act."'6
Although both the antitrust laws and the DTPA ultimately are con-
cerned with consumer welfare, they focus on different aspects of the com-
petitive process. While antitrust primarily is concerned with the misuse
of market power to harm consumers, the DTPA primarily focuses on con-
sumer harm through deception. Further, although consumer protection
statutes like the DTPA are frequently referred to as "little FTC Acts,"
'7
the Texas legislature did not include the "unfair methods of competition"
prohibition contained in section 5 of the FTC Act, rather adopted only
the "deceptive acts or practices" prong of that statute.
8
This survey covers significant developments under the federal and
Texas antitrust laws and the Texas DTPA from November 1, 2006 through
October 31, 2007.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
2. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 251
(1993).
3. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44(a) (Vernon 2002).
4. Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX (1978)).
5. Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Holymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1994).
6. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(1) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
7. Maria Pleyte, Online Undercover Marketing: A Reminder of the FTC's Unique Po-
sition to Combat Deceptive Practices, 6 U.C. DAvIs Bus. L.J. 14 (2006) ("Many states have
enacted consumer protection laws known as Little FTC Acts. ").
8. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
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II. ANTITRUST STATUTES
"The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, the Clayton Act, enacted in 1914,
and the Robinson-Patman Act, which amended the Clayton Act in 1936,
all serve the purpose of protecting competition."9 Likewise, the purpose
of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act ("TFEAA") a0 "is to
maintain and promote economic competition in trade and commerce oc-
curring wholly or partly within the State of Texas and to provide the ben-
efits of that competition to consumers in the state."1  Noteworthy
antitrust decisions rendered during the Survey period address standards
of proof and pleading, concerted refusals to deal, and antitrust injury.
The principal federal antitrust statutes are sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act.1 2 Section 1 condemns contracts, combinations, and conspira-
cies in unreasonable restraint of trade.13  Section 2 condemns
monopolization and attempts and conspiracies to monopolize a relevant
economic market.14 Although certain offenses like price-fixing among
competitors are deemed unlawful per se and no proof of actual market
impact is required to demonstrate a violation, most antitrust claims re-
quire proof of an actual or threatened injury to competition, which usu-
ally requires proof that the defendant possesses market power in a
relevant economic market. 15 The analytical approach used to make this
determination is called the "rule of reason. '1 6
In Leegin, a divided Supreme Court overturned ninety-six years of pre-
cedent to hold that minimum resale price maintenance is no longer per se
illegal under section 1; instead it is to be judged under the rule of rea-
son. 17 In so holding, the five-to-four majority overruled Dr. Miles Medi-
cal Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,18 which held that it is always unlawful
for a manufacturer and its distributor or retailer to agree on the minimum
price that the latter will charge on resale of the manufacturer's goods. 19
At the time of trial, Leegin manufactured the Brighton line of women's
accessories, which were sold primarily in small, independently-owned
boutiques.2 0 Leegin sold Brighton products to the plaintiff, a women's
9. Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 251
(1993) (citations omitted).
10. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.52 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
11. Id. § 15.04.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006). The parallel provisions exist under Texas law. TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05 (a)-(b) (Vernon 2002).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Notwithstanding the literal language of the statute, the Supreme
Court recognized as early as 1911 that section 1 only condemns unreasonable restraints.
Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 175-84 (1911); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Statio-
nary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
15. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).16. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007).
17. Id.
18. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
19. Id. at 384-85.
20. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710.
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clothing and accessories specialty store.21 In 1997, Leegin instituted its
"Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy," which provided that
Leegin would only do business with retailers who followed its suggested
retail prices.22 Leegin also introduced a marketing initiative that re-
warded retailers for certain promotional activities.2 3 This initiative re-
quired retailers to pledge to follow the "Brighton Suggested Pricing
Policy at all times."'24
In contravention of Leegin's policies, the plaintiff placed its entire line
of Brighton products on sale.2 5 When the plaintiff refused to stop dis-
counting, Leegin suspended all shipments of Brighton products to the
plaintiff, resulting in a substantial decrease in the plaintiff's sales.26 The
plaintiff sued, claiming that Leegin had violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act by entering into illegal agreements with retailers to fix the prices of
Brighton products and by terminating the plaintiff for not complying with
those agreements. 27 Leegin had planned to introduce expert testimony at
trial describing the procompetitive effects of its pricing policy. 28 Relying
on the Dr. Miles per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance,
the district court excluded the proffered testimony as irrelevant to the
jury's inquiry.29 The jury found that Leegin and its retailers agreed to fix
prices, causing the plaintiff to suffer antitrust injury and lost profits of
$1.2 million.30
In an unpublished opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
judgment, holding that Dr. Miles required application of the per se rule
notwithstanding Leegin's claimed lack of competitive harm.31 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. 32
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted that Dr. Miles was
based on the common law rule that restraints upon alienation were ordi-
narily invalid and on the argument that resale price agreements are anal-
ogous to an illegal agreement between competing distributors because
the resale agreements benefit the distributors, not the manufacturer 33
The majority further argued that these rationales had been abandoned by
more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. 34 Since Dr. Miles, the Su-
preme Court has rejected attempts to base antitrust law on "formalistic"
legal doctrines, such as the common law rule against restraints upon
21. Id. at 2711.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2710-11.
25. Id. at 2711.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2712.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2711-12.
31. Id. at 2712.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2713-14.
34. Id. at 2714.
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alienation, in favor of demonstrable economic effects.35 Quoting Conti-
nental TV., the majority "reaffirm[ed] that 'the state of the common law
400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the effect of
the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the American
economy today."' 36 The majority similarly concluded that since Dr.
Miles, the Supreme Court has rejected analyzing vertical restraints by
comparing them to horizontal restraints. 37
Finding that the foundations of the Dr. Miles rule have since been re-jected, the majority determined that it should reexamine whether a per se
prohibition against minimum resale price maintenance is appropriate. 38
In doing so, the majority cited empirical studies and economics literature
skeptical of resale price maintenance claims, suggesting procompetitive
reasons for a manufacturer's imposition of mandatory resale prices. 39
Conceding that resale price maintenance can have anticompetitive ef-
fects, the majority asserted that the elimination of intrabrand price com-
petition also may encourage
retailers to invest in tangible or intangible services or promotional
efforts that aid the manufacturer's position as against rival manufac-
turers. Resale price maintenance also has the potential to give con-
sumers more options so that they can choose among low-price, low-
service brands; high-price, high-service brands; and brands that fall
in between. 40
The majority concluded that resale price maintenance can increase in-
terbrand competition by "facilitating market entry for new firms and
brands" and by encouraging retailer services that would not otherwise be
provided. 41 These procompetitive justifications made application of the
per se rule inappropriate because a per se prohibition would "proscribe a
significant amount of procompetitive conduct. '42 In so holding, the ma-jority rejected stare decisis as a reason to maintain the per se rule in large
part because the Sherman Act is expected to "evolve to meet the dynam-
ics of present economic conditions" and because it is not uncommon for
the Supreme Court to reverse precedent where, as here, subsequent cases
have undermined an opinion's doctrinal basis. 43
The majority provided limited guidance for the application of its newly-
announced "rule of reason" test, suggesting that lower courts should con-
sider the number of manufacturers in a given industry that make use of
the practice to determine the likelihood that the practice is being used to
facilitate a manufacturer cartel.44 Also relevant is the source of the re-
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2714.
37. Id. at 2713-14.
38. Id. at 2714.
39. Id. at 2714-15.
40. Id. at 2715.
41. Id. at 2716.
42. Id. at 2718.
43. Id. at 2715-2725.
44. Id. at 2719.
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straint, because if retailers are the impetus, the restraint might be facili-
tating a retailer cartel or supporting a dominant, inefficient retailer.
45
The majority also suggested that the market power of the manufacturer
and retailer involved should be considered because a dominant player
could abuse resale price maintenance for anticompetitive purposes.
46
Finally, while acknowledging that "reliance on a judicial opinion is a
significant reason to adhere to it, especially in cases involving property
and contract rights,"'47 the majority concluded that "[t]he reliance inter-
ests ... cannot justify an inefficient rule."'48
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dis-
sented.49 For the dissent, the doctrine of stare decisis mandated contin-
ued adherence to Dr. Miles.50 Justice Breyer argued that no changed
circumstances justified departure from the nearly century-old per se pro-
hibition against minimum resale price maintenance, particularly given
that in 1975 Congress repealed the McGuire and Miller-Tydings Acts
which had made certain acts of resale price maintenance lawful. 51 The
dissent concluded that in doing so, Congress had consciously extended
the Dr. Miles rule of per se illegality.52 Indeed, the Congress considered
and rejected "virtually every argument presented now to this Court
[against the Dr. Miles rule] as well as others not here presented. '53
Surveying the anti-resale-price maintenance economic literature, Jus-
tice Breyer found it variously flawed and criticized, and noted that "many
other economists take a different view. Regardless, taken together these
studies at most may offer some mild support for the majority's position.
But they cannot constitute a major change in circumstances" warranting
departure from the rule of per se illegality. 54 The dissent reached a simi-
lar conclusion with respect to changes in the United States economy that
might justify abandonment of the per se rule, concluding: "In sum, there
is no relevant change.55 And without some change, there is no ground for
abandoning a well-established antitrust rule." 56
Justice Breyer then examined the list of factors the Supreme Court
should consider before overturning its own precedent. 57 The dissent de-
termined that the following factors preponderated against overruling Dr.
Miles: the case was statutory, not constitutional; Dr. Miles is almost 100
years old and has been relied upon by the Supreme Court in the interim;
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2720.
47. Id. at 2724 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2725.
50. Id. at 2725-26.
51. Id. at 2731.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 2732.
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the per se rule has not created an unworkable legal regime; Dr. Miles has
not unsettled the law; the case involves property and contract rights; and
the Dr. Miles rule has become "embedded in our national culture.15 8
In conclusion, the dissent argued that "a court that rests its decision
upon economists' views of the economic merits should also take account
of legal scholars' views about common-law overruling. '59 Noting that the
relevant jurisprudence weighs strongly in favor of stare decisis in these
circumstances, Justice Breyer observed that "the only safe predictions to
make about today's decision are that it likely will raise the price of goods
at retail and that it will create considerable legal turbulence as lower
courts seek to develop workable principles. '60
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 61 the United States Supreme Court
held that a complaint alleging that competitors engaged in parallel con-
duct but lacking a description of facts "suggesting agreement, as distinct
from identical, independent action" cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.62
The plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a putative class of all "sub-
scribers of local telephone and/or high speed internet services," alleged a
conspiracy in restraint of trade that resulted in inflated charges for local
telephone and high-speed internet service. 63 The defendants were the
former "Baby Bells," or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs"),
originally created as regional monopolies by the divestiture of AT&T. 64
More than a decade after the divestiture, Congress enacted the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996, which withdrew approval of the ILECs' monop-
olies and imposed duties upon the ILECs to facilitate market entry by
others,65 including the obligation to share the ILECs' networks with com-
petitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs"). 66 The ILECs successfully lit-
igated the scope of their sharing obligation, which resulted in a narrower
of the range of network elements that must be shared with the CLECs.67
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs engaged in par-
allel conduct in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of up-
start CLECs, including making unfair agreements for access to the ILEC
networks and providing inferior connections to those networks. 68 The
plaintiffs further alleged that the ILECs had a common motivation to
suppress competition from the CLECs, which led the ILECs to form a
conspiracy.6 9 The plaintiffs also alleged that the ILECs agreed not to
58. Id. at 2734-36.
59. Id. at 2737.
60. Id.
61. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
62. Id. at 1961.
63. Id. at 1962.
64. Id. at 1961.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1961-62.




compete with each other, which could be inferred from the fact that the
ILECs had failed to pursue business opportunities in each other's
markets.70
The district court granted the ILECs' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.71 The court held that circumstantial evidence of consciously
parallel behavior was insufficient to state a claim under section 1 of the
Sherman Act absent the allegation of facts tending to show that the de-
fendants' behavior could not be explained as independent, self-interested
conduct.72 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that an antitrust plaintiff
asserting a section 1 claim based upon parallel conduct need not plead
"plus factors," but need only plead facts demonstrating that a conspiracy
is plausible. 73
The Supreme Court reversed in a seven-to-two decision.74 Writing for
the majority, Justice Souter first restated the standard for proving an anti-
trust conspiracy.75 Parallel behavior of competitors, even when done
consciously of each other's actions, is admissible circumstantial evidence
of an agreement but does not itself conclusively establish such an agree-
ment.76 Parallel conduct is consistent with both conspiracy and unilat-
eral, competitive business strategy.77 In order to survive summary
judgment, a plaintiff must offer evidence that tends to rule out indepen-
dent action by the defendants. 78 Also, Parallel conduct standing alone
does not entitle a plaintiff to a directed verdict.
79
In analyzing what is required at the pleading stage, the majority ac-
knowledged that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is enti-
tled to relief."80 A plaintiff need not include detailed factual allegations
but must do more than recite the elements of a cause of action, and the
allegations in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level."' 81 The majority then disavowed the Su-
preme Court's earlier statement in Conley v. Gibson,82 that a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."'83 Although lower courts had
relied upon the "no set of facts" language to permit a claim to survive
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal unless its factual impossibility was shown from
70. Id. at 1962.
71. Id. at 1963.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1960.






81. Id. at 1964-65.
82. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
83. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968.
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the face of the pleadings, the majority concluded that "[t]he phrase is best
forgotten."84
The majority offered two reasons for rejecting the dissent's argument
that disposing of implausible claims should be accomplished after the
pleading stage. 85 First, discovery is expensive and time-consuming and
second, courts have had limited success in checking discovery abuse. 86
The expense of discovery means that defendants are likely to settle even
meritless claims before the summary judgment or trial stages.8 7
Applying its new standard to section 1 claims, the Supreme Court held
that "stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made," which "calls for
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of illegal agreement. '88 The keyword in the standard is "sug-
gest." 89 The majority distinguished between allegations merely consistent
with an agreement, which are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss,
and allegations suggesting an agreement, which will survive such a mo-
tion.90 Similarly, showing the possibility of entitlement to relief is not
enough and a plaintiff must plead facts showing that entitlement to relief
is plausible.9 1 The majority then concluded that because parallel conduct
standing alone does not establish a conspiracy, an allegation of parallel
conduct accompanied by a bare allegation of conspiracy is insufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss. 92
Turning to the plaintiffs' complaint, the majority found that no actual
agreement between the ILECs was alleged, and that nothing in the com-
plaint "invests either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible sug-
gestion of conspiracy" given the independent reasons that each ILEC
would have to resist competition from the CLECs, the historical genesis
of the ILECs as sanctioned monopolies, and the difficulties the CLECs
were having competing with the ILECs. 93 "Because the plaintiffs [had]
not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,"
the Supreme Court held that dismissal was appropriate. 94
Dissenting, Justice Stevens observed that this case did not involve the
question of whether parallel anticompetitive conduct of potential com-
petitors that has anticompetitive effects, standing alone, will support a
section 1 claim.95 "The answer to that question has been settled for more
84. Id. at 1964-65, 1968-69.
85. Id. at 1966-67.
86. Id. at 1967.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1965.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1966.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1965-66.
93. Id. at 1971.




than 50 years."' 96 Rather, the issue before the Supreme Court was the
requisite degree of specificity required for pleading an agreement not to
compete.97 Noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only
that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Justice Stevens emphasized that
"[u]nder the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal Rules, the idea
was not to keep litigants out of court, but rather to keep them in."
98
Proof of this is found in Form 9, appended to the Federal Rules, which
alleges negligence in the barest of terms. As Justice Stevens noted, the
Supreme Court has previously endorsed Form 9 "as an example of the
simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate." 99
With respect to the majority's dismissal of Conley's "no set of facts"
language as having "puzzle[ed] the [legal] profession for 50 years," Justice
Stevens went on to cite a dozen opinions of the Supreme Court and four
separate writings, where "the language [was not] 'questioned,' 'criticized,'
or explained away;" as well as decisions of the courts of twenty-six states
that have utilized the Conley formulation. 100 Emphasizing that "[t]his
case is a poor vehicle for the Court's new pleading rule," because in anti-
trust cases, "the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspira-
tors," 101 Justice Stevens expressed the following concern:
I fear that the unfortunate result of the majority's new pleading rule
will be to invite lawyers' debates over economic theory to conclu-
sively resolve antitrust suits in the absence of any evidence. It is no
surprise that the antitrust defense bar-among whom "lament" as to
inadequate judicial supervision of discovery is most "common,"-
should lobby for this state of affairs. But "we must recall that their
primary responsibility is to win cases for their clients, not to improve
law administration for the public."
10 2
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.10 3 the
Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether a plaintiff alleging
predatory bidding must meet the same test applied to claims of predatory
pricing.104 Plaintiff Ross-Simmons had been a hardwood lumber sawmill
in the Pacific Northwest since the 1960s. 105 Defendant Weyerhaeuser en-
tered the market in 1980 by acquiring an existing lumber company and
owned six hardwood sawmills.106 Both companies acquired red alder
96. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954)).
97. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974-75.
98. Id. at 1975-76.
99. Id. at 1977 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 n.4 (2002)).
100. Id. at 1978.
101. Id. at 1983 (quoting Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976)
(quoting Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)).
102. Id. at 1988 (quoting CLARK, SPECIAL PLEADING IN THE "BIG CASE?," PROCE-
DURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE 52 (C. Wright & H. Reasoner eds. 1965).
103. 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007).
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sawlogs on the open bidding market. 10 7 Between 1998 and 2001, prices
for sawlogs rose while prices for the finished lumber fell.' 08 Ross-Sim-
mons suffered heavy losses and eventually shut its mill.'0 9 Ross-Simmons
then sued Weyerhaeuser for monopolization and attempted monopoliza-
tion, alleging that Weyerhaeuser had overpaid for sawlogs in order to ar-
tificially raise prices such that Ross-Simmons could not make a profit.' 0
Weyerhaeuser moved for summary judgment before trial and for judg-
ment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence.11 The district court
denied both motions and instructed the jury that Ross-Simmons could
succeed on its predatory bidding case if the jury found that Weyerhaeuser
"purchased more logs than it needed, or paid a higher price for logs than
necessary in order to prevent [Ross-Simmons] from obtaining the logs
they needed at a fair price. '' 112 The jury found for Ross-Simmons on the
monopolization claim and awarded $26 million in damages. 113
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Weyerhaeuser argued that proof of
illegal predatory bidding should mirror that required by the Supreme
Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.1' 4 for
predatory pricing-pricing below cost in order to drive rivals from the
market.1 5 In Brooke Group, the Supreme Court held that recovery on a
predatory pricing claim requires proof that prices are below an "appro-
priate measure" of the competitor's costs and that the competitor had a
"dangerous probability" of recouping the losses caused by the below-cost
pricing.' 16 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Weyerhaeuser and affirmed
the jury's verdict. 17
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper test for
analyzing a claim of monopolization by predatory bidding.118 Writing for
a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Thomas relied heavily on scholarly
articles, describing predatory bidding as a scheme in which a buyer ac-
quires monopsony power by bidding up the market price of a necessary
product so high that rival buyers cannot compete. 119 Once the buyer has
caused its competitors to leave the market, it seeks to reduce the price for
the products by restricting its purchases below the competitive level. 120
The resulting cost savings then offset any losses incurred during the bid-
ding-up phase.' 2 1 The Court noted that when the predatory firm's com-
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1073.
109. Id.




114. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
115. Weyerhaueuser Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1073.
116. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-23.
117. Weyerhaeuser Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1073-74.
118. Id. at 1074.
119. Id. at 1074-75.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1074-76.
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petitors participate in both the input and output markets, the would-be
predator might also recoup its losses by raising the output prices to mo-
nopolistic levels. 122
The Supreme Court held that predatory pricing and predatory bidding
are economically similar in that both involve "the deliberate use of unilat-
eral pricing measures for anticompetitive purposes. ' 12 3 As the Court
explained:
Predatory pricing requires a firm to suffer certain losses in the short
term on the chance of reaping supracompetitive profits in the future.
A rational business will rarely make this sacrifice. The same reason-
ing applies to predatory bidding. A predatory-bidding scheme re-
quires a buyer of inputs to suffer losses today on the chance that it
will reap supracompetitive profits in the future. For this reason
"[s]uccessful monopsony predation is probably as unlikely as suc-
cessful monopoly predation."'1 2
4
The Supreme Court also recognized that firms may have legitimate,
even procompetitive, reasons for setting low prices for their outputs or
paying high prices for needed inputs, and that failed predatory pricing
schemes and failed predatory bidding schemes both may benefit
consumers.
125
These similarities convinced the Court that the two-pronged Brooke
Group test was appropriately applied to predatory bidding.126 A plaintiff
alleging predatory bidding therefore must prove that the alleged preda-
tory bidding led to below-cost pricing of the bidder's outputs because the
cost of the outputs exceeded the revenues generated in selling those out-
puts. 127 The plaintiff also must "prove that the [bidder] has a dangerous
probability of recouping the losses incurred in bidding up input prices
through the exercise of monopsony power."'1 28 Ross-Simmons conceded
that it had not satisfied the Brooke Group test.' 29 Its predatory bidding
theory thus could not support the jury's verdict.' 30
In Credit Suisse Securities, LLC v. Billing,'3a a putative class of securi-
ties investors sued the underwriting firms that marketed and distributed
the securities, alleging that the firms had violated the antitrust laws by
agreeing with each other to refuse to sell buyers shares of a popular new
issue unless the buyers agreed to additional terms.1 32 The Supreme
Court, in a 7-1 decision (Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, Jus-
122. Id. at 1076.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1077 (quoting R. BLAIR & J. HARRISON, MONOPSONY 66 (1993)).
125. Id. (citing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 224 (1993)).





131. 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
132. Id. at 2387.
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tice Kennedy took no part in the decision) held that the securities laws
implicitly precluded the antitrust claims. 133
In the typical initial public offering ("IPO") of a company's shares, se-
curities underwriters form a syndicate to market the shares. 34 The syndi-
cate conducts an investigation into suitable initial share prices and
quantities and makes a recommendation to the issuer.135 The investiga-
tion typically involves meetings between potential investors and the syn-
dicate underwriters and representatives of the issuer in which the
underwriters present information about the company and the stock and
attempt to gauge the strength of the investors' interest in the stock.' 36
The syndicate and the company then agree upon the number of shares to
be sold and the price per share. 137 The syndicate buys all the newly-is-
sued shares from the company at a discount and then resells the shares to
the public at the agreed-upon price, netting the difference as
commissions.138
A group of sixty investors filed two antitrust class actions against ten
leading investment banks that allegedly formed underwriting syndicates
to help execute the IPOs of several hundred technology-related compa-
nies.139 The investors alleged that the underwriters had "abused the...
practice of combining into underwriting syndicates" by agreeing to im-
pose conditions upon potential investors.' 40 Specifically, the underwrit-
ers allegedly required the investors to pay charges in addition to the usual
underwriting commission in the form of (1) investor promises to place
bids in the aftermarket at higher prices; (2) investor promises to purchase
other, less attractive securities; and (3) investor payment of excessive
"commissions," including agreements to purchase an issuer's shares in
follow-up public offerings. 141 The investors also alleged that the under-
writers' agreement artificially inflated the price of the securities in
question.142
The underwriters moved to dismiss the investors' complaints on the
ground that the federal securities laws impliedly preclude application of
antitrust law to the alleged conduct. 143 The district court granted the mo-
tion to dismiss, but the Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 144
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer first canvassed three prior Su-
preme Court decisions addressing the relationship between securities law
133. Id. at 2386-87.













and antitrust law: Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,145 Gordon v. New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. ,146 and United States v. National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"). 147 In Silver, the Supreme Court held
that, where possible, courts should reconcile the operation of the securi-
ties and antitrust laws where possible, and that the securities laws should
be implied to have precluded application of the antitrust laws only when
necessary and then only to the extent necessary, to make the Securities
Exchange Act work. 148 The Silver Court found no such necessity and
held that the securities laws did not preclude application of the antitrust
laws to an alleged boycott of a broker by the New York Stock Ex-
change.' 49 In Gordon, the Supreme Court held that an "implied repeal"
of the antitrust laws should be found only when there is a "plain repug-
nancy" between the two statutory schemes. 150 The Gordon Court found
that such a repugnancy precluded application of the antitrust laws to a
complaint regarding the commissions charged by stockbrokers. 151 In do-
ing so, the Supreme Court relied in large part on the direct regulatory
power of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") over under-
writer commissions and the SEC's active role in reviewing commission
rates.' 52 In NASD, the Supreme Court applied a "clear repugnancy" test
in holding that the securities laws precluded an antitrust claim alleging
that securities broker-dealers had conspired to, among other things, fix
prices and terms of sale.153 Again, the NASD Court relied upon the
SEC's existing regulatory authority over the challenged practices.
154
This review of prior cases led the Supreme Court to conclude that the
proper test for determining whether the securities laws preclude applica-
tion of the antitrust laws is whether, given the context and the likely con-
sequences, the securities laws and the antitrust allegations are "clearly
incompatible."'1 55 Relying on Gordon and NASD, the Court concluded
that, in making this determination, the following factors are critical: (1)
the existence of securities-related regulatory authority over the activities
in question; (2) evidence of the exercise of that authority; (3) a risk that if
both schemes were applicable, conflicting guidance, requirements, duties,
privileges, or standards of conduct would arise; and (4) whether the chal-
lenged practices "lie squarely within an area of financial market activity
that the securities law seeks to regulate.' 56
145. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
146. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
147. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
148. 127 S. Ct. at 2389-90.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2390.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2391.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2392.
156. Id.
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Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Supreme Court
quickly concluded that the first two factors preponderated in favor of pre-
clusion. 157 The Court found that the SEC has authority to supervise all of
the IPO-related activities in question and has continuously exercised that
authority. The Court also found that the fourth factor supported preclu-
sion because the activities in question were "central to the proper func-
tioning of well-regulated capital markets.
1t 58
Turning to the third factor-the risk of conflict-the Supreme Court
read the investors' complaints regarding particular underwriting practices
to attack the manner in which the underwriters jointly sought to collect
the allegedly excessive commissions.159 The investors contended that
these claims could not be repugnant to the securities laws because the
SEC has disapproved of the challenged practices. 160 The Court rejected
this argument, holding instead that the securities and antitrust laws were
clearly incompatible in this situation.161 The Court relied on several
facts, the first of which was the "fine, complex, detailed line" that cur-
rently separates IPO-related underwriter activity "that the SEC permits
or encourages ... from activity that the SEC must (and inevitably will)
forbid." 162 The Court determined that "evidence tending to show unlaw-
ful antitrust activity and evidence tending to show lawful securities mar-
keting activity may overlap, or prove identical. ' 163 Because of this fine
line, the Supreme Court expressed concern that nonexpert judges and
juries would be unable to separate acceptable behavior on the part of
underwriters from unacceptable behavior, given the "nuanced nature" of
the required evidentiary evaluations. Given the fact-specific nature of
the evaluations, different courts might not evaluate similar fact patterns
consistently. 164
The Court believed that "antitrust courts are likely to make unusually
serious mistakes" in attempting to differentiate between lawful and un-
lawful activities. 165 Such likelihood of mistakes, in the Court's view,
means that underwriters would have to forgo permitted activities in order
to safely avoid prohibited activities. 16 6 The Court acknowledged that this
may be a problem "to some degree in respect to other antitrust lawsuits,"
but concluded that mistakes are "unusually likely" in the IPO arena.
167
The Supreme Court concluded that allowing an antitrust lawsuit in
these circumstances "would threaten serious harm to the efficient func-
tioning of the securities markets," that there was an unusually small en-
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2393.
159. Id. at 2393-94.
160. Id. at 2394.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2395.
164. Id.





forcement-related need for antitrust lawsuits, and that permitting
antitrust lawsuits might enable a plaintiff to circumvent the procedural
requirements that securities plaintiffs must satisfy.' 68 In the face of these
conflicts, the securities laws were clearly incompatible with the applica-
tion of the antitrust laws to the underwriters' complained-of activities. 169
Concurring in the judgment, but not the majority's opinion, Justice Ste-
vens opined that the complained-of activity did not violate the antitrust
laws. 170 Justice Stevens went on, however, to disagree with another as-
pect of the Court's opinion:
I would not suggest, as the Court did in Twombly, and as it does
again today, that either the burdens of antitrust litigation or the risk
'that antitrust courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes,'
should play any role in the analysis of the question of law presented
in a case such as this.171
Justice Thomas dissented. He concluded that the savings clauses of the
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act preserved the plaintiffs'
rights and remedies under the antitrust laws. 172
The Fifth Circuit considered the standard for concerted refusals to deal
in Tunica Web Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators Association,
Inc.,173 which involved an Internet advertising company that sued casino
operators. Tunica Web Advertising and its owner, Cherry Graziosi,
owned the domain names "tunicamiss.com," "tunicamississippi.com," and
"tunica.com" and leased the domains to the Gold Strike casino in Tunica
County, Mississippi for several years. 174 None of the domains had a web-
site.' 75 Instead, they redirected searchers to the casino's home page. 176
The Tunica Country Tourism Commission ( "TCTC") sued Graziosi,
alleging that she was a cybersquatter who had no right to own "tuni-
camiss.com" or "tunicamississippi.com.' 77 As part of the settlement of
that suit, Graziosi transferred her rights in "tunicamiss.com" and "tuni-
camississippi.com" to the TCTC and the TCTC released their claims to
"tunica.com."1 78
Graziosi then proposed to the TCTC that she lease "tunica.com" col-
lectively to all the casinos in Tunica County.1 79 Under the terms of the
proposal, in exchange for a monthly payment from each casino, visitors to
"tunica.com" would be redirected to the TCTC website, which already
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2396-97.
170. Id. at 2398.
171. Id. (Stevens, J. concurring).
172. Id. at 2399 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
173. 496 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2007).
174. Id. at 406-07.
175. Id. at 406.
176. Id.
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contained information about the casinos. 180 The proposal was referred to
the casinos' trade group, the Tunica Casino Operators Association
("TCOA"). 18 1 The TCOA met and discussed the proposal and reached a
consensus to not utilize the "tunica.com" domain name. 182 Graziosi and
Tunica Web Advertising contend that at the same meeting, members of
the TCOA agreed to individually refuse to deal with Tunica Web Adver-
tising on any terms.' 83 Shortly after the TCOA meeting, the Gold Strike
casino cancelled its lease of "tunica.com. 1 84 Gold Strike's marketing di-
rector allegedly told Graziosi that the casinos had entered into a "gentle-
men's agreement" not to do business with Tunica Web Advertising and
that her "hands were officially tied" by the TCOA.1 85 Supposedly, the
refusal to deal was intended to lower the value of the "tunica.com" do-
main name. 186
Tunica Web Advertising then developed its own web site at "tu-
nica.com" with the intention of generating revenue through advertising
from casinos and commissions from online hotel booking.1 8 7 Tunica Web
Advertising approached the casinos with this new business model, but
none of the casinos chose to advertise on the site. 88 Graziosi and Tunica
Web Advertising alleged that this refusal conformed to the earlier agree-
ment to refuse to deal with Tunica Web Advertising, and presented an
email from Gold Strike's marketing director to Graziosi stating that the
TCOA later met and reaffirmed its agreement.18 9
Graziosi and Tunica Web Advertising sued the casinos, the TCTC, and
the TCOA. The TCTC was dismissed by the court on immunity grounds
and the TCOA and Gold Strike were dismissed by agreement of the par-
ties.1 90 The trial court granted summary judgment for the remaining casi-
nos, holding that (1) the casinos' alleged conduct could not constitute a
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act; (2) the alleged original
agreement not to deal with Tunica Web Advertising was a legal joint re-
sponse to a joint proposal; and (3) Tunica Web Advertising did not show
that any refusals to deal after the original agreement were the result of
concerted action because it did not present detailed evidence of its pro-
posals to the casinos.191
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the casinos' original agreement















was a joint response to a joint proposal.192 The court disagreed, however,
with the argument that there was no evidence of any actionable agree-
ment.' 93 The statements by Gold Coast's marketing director disclosing a
"gentlemen's agreement" between the casinos that none of them would
use "tunica.com" or deal with Tunica Web Advertising, and the later
email reporting a subsequent agreement were sufficient to raise a fact
issue about whether the casinos had engaged in concerted action. 194 Such
direct evidence of an agreement relieved the plaintiffs of the need to pro-
vide circumstantial evidence of an agreement such as details of the re-
jected proposals to the casinos. 195 The direct evidence also meant that
the existence of plausible reasons for independent action did not establish
the casinos' right to summary judgment. 196
The Fifth Circuit also considered Tunica Web Advertising's argument
that the refusal to deal was a per se illegal horizontal boycott.1 97 Al-
though the casinos clearly were direct competitors, they pointed to lan-
guage from the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit suggesting that per se
illegal boycotts are those intended to harm a competitor of the conspira-
tors.198 Relying on this language, the casinos argued that a per se illegal
horizontal boycott requires that at least one of the conspirators be a di-
rect competitor of the victim.1 99 Acknowledging that "[p]recisely which
group boycotts are subject to the per se rule is ... not always clear," the
court observed that the Supreme Court has never held that injury to a
competitor of the conspirators is an absolute prerequisite to a finding of
per se illegality, and concluded that the district court had erred in so hold-
ing.200 Relying on Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Station-
ery & Printing Co.,201 the Fifth Circuit held that in determining whether
the per se rule should apply to the alleged horizontal boycott, a court
should consider "(1) whether the casinos hold a dominant position in the
relevant market; (2) whether the casinos control access to an element
necessary to enable [Tunica Web Advertising] to compete; and (3)
whether there exist plausible arguments concerning pro-competitive ef-
fects. '202 The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to allow the district court
to make the first analysis of these issues.203
The Fifth Circuit also considered the antitrust injury component of
standing during the Survey period. In Norris v. The Hearst Trust,20 4 for-
mer distributors of the Houston Chronicle sued the newspaper's owners,
192. Id. at 410.
193. Id. at 411.
194. Id. at 410-11.
195. Id. at 411.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 412.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 412, 414.
201. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
202. 496 F.3d at 414-15.
203. Id. at 415.
204. 500 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2007).
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complaining that they had been wrongfully terminated. The Fifth Circuit
held that the former distributors' antitrust claims failed because they
lacked antitrust injury and antitrust standing.20 5
The Hearst Trust, the Hearst Corporation, and Hearst Newspapers
Partnership, L.P. (collectively, "Hearst") cancelled the plaintiffs' distribu-
tion agreements for the Chronicle, the only daily newspaper of general
circulation in the greater Houston area. 20 6 All but one of the plaintiffs
sued in state court, alleging that Hearst had coerced the plaintiffs into
producing fraudulent circulation reports and that cancellation of their dis-
tribution contracts was in retaliation for the plaintiffs' complaints.
20 7
Judgment was entered against the plaintiffs in state court and, joined by
an additional distributor, they filed suit in federal court asserting essen-
tially the same claims with the addition of federal and state antitrust
claims.20 8 The only product described in the distributors' complaint was
the Houston Chronicle and the only users of that product were its readers
and advertisers. 20 9 The distributors did not allege that they were consum-
ers of the paper or its advertising services or that they were competitors
of Hearst or the paper. Nor did they allege that the cancellation of their
distribution agreements had harmed the subscribers or readers. 210 They
did allege that their termination had been related to Hearst's plan to in-
flate circulation figures with the intended result of increasing advertising
sales and revenue.211
The district court granted Hearst's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
holding that the plaintiffs' re-repleaded state court claims were barred by
res judicata and collateral estoppel due to the prior state court judgment
and that the antitrust claims were barred for lack of antitrust injury and
antitrust standing.212 On appeal, the distributors argued that they had
sustained antitrust injury because they were terminated as a result of
their refusal to participate in Hearst's illegal scheme to raise advertising
prices, itself an antitrust violation.213 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, finding that the only persons who would be directly injured by
Hearst's scheme to inflate circulation numbers would be those desiring to
advertise in the Chronicle and other media that sell advertising. 21 4 The
court concluded that such persons were the appropriate parties to sue for
any violation arising from Hearst's alleged scheme.
215
The court further held that the plaintiffs' bare allegations that Hearst
had vertically integrated into newspaper distribution and therefore was
205. Id. at 469.
206. Id. at 457.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 457, 460.
209. Id. at 463.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 463-64.
212. Id. at 460.
213. Id. at 463-64, 466.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 466.
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the distributors' competitor did not confer antitrust standing in the ab-
sence of any allegation that the vertical integration had anything to do
with the plaintiffs' termination. 216 There was no allegation that the plain-
tiffs' termination increased the Chronicle's price or decreased its availa-
bility.217 In these circumstances, even had Hearst terminated the
distributors in order to take over the Chronicle distribution, Hearst would
not have committed an antitrust violation giving rise to antitrust injury to
the distributors.218
III. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
The DTPA was enacted in 1973 "to protect consumers against false,
misleading and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and
breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures
to secure such protection. '219 Noteworthy DTPA decisions during the
survey period address the sufficiency of the evidence of a DTPA viola-
tion, preemption, and damages.
A. STANDING AND CONSUMER STATUS
In order to bring a DTPA claim, a plaintiff must be a "consumer" as
defined in the statute.220 To qualify as a consumer, the plaintiff must be
one who "seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services;"
further, those goods or services must form the basis of the plaintiff's com-
plaint.221 Consumer status under the DTPA depends upon a showing
that the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction entitles him to relief.222
When the facts underlying the determination of consumer status are un-
disputed, whether a plaintiff qualifies for such status is a question of
law.
2 2 3
The First District Houston Court of Appeals, in Richardson-Eagle, Inc.
v. William M. Mercer, Inc.,224 affirmed the dismissal of a plaintiff's DTPA
claims by determining that the plaintiff was not a consumer.225 In this
factually convoluted matter, Mercer contracted with the Houston Inde-
pendent School District ("HISD") to solicit bids for a benefit plan to be
216. Id. at 468.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 468.
219. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44(a) (Vernon 2002).
220. See id. § 17.50.
221. Id. § 17.45(4); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex.
1987).
222. Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996). See also Sanchez v.
Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "DTPA claim
requires an underlying consumer transaction; there must be a nexus between the con-
sumer, the transaction, and the defendant's conduct") (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 650).
223. Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 406 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1997, writ dism'd by agr.).
224. 213 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2007, pet. denied).
225. Richardson-Eagle, 213 S.W.3d at 477.
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provided by HISD to its employees. 2 26 Richardson-Eagle responded to
the bid on behalf of two insurance companies, one who offered to provide
a disability insurance policy and the other who offered a cancer and hos-
pital-indemnity policy. 227 HISD rejected the proposals and directed Mer-
cer to negotiate directly with the two insurance companies that submitted
bids. While one company refused to negotiate, the other did, ultimately
leading to a contract.2 28
Richardson-Eagle then filed suit against Mercer asserting a multitude
of claims, including tortious interference and violations of the DTPA.
229
Mercer moved for summary judgment arguing that Richardson-Eagle was
not a consumer and therefore lacked standing to sue under the DTPA.
230
The trial court agreed, finding that Richardson-Eagle did not seek goods
or services from Mercer, and accordingly granted summary judgment,
which was affirmed by the Houston court.
231
B. DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff must
show that a "false, misleading, or deceptive act," breach of warranty, or
unconscionable action or course of action occurred, and that such con-
duct was the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage. 232
1. Laundry List Claims
DTPA section 17.46(b) contains, in 27 subparts, a nonexclusive "laun-
dry list" of actions that constitute "false, misleading or deceptive acts"
under the statute.
Bossier Chrysler-Dodge II, Inc. v. Riley,233 involved allegations of two
of these "laundry list" actions-section 17.46(b)(12), which prohibits rep-
resenting that an agreement conferred or involved rights, remedies, or
obligations that it did not have, and section 17.46(b)(24), which prohibits
failure to disclose known information with the intent to induce a con-
sumer into a transaction the consumer would not have entered if the in-
formation had been disclosed.234 Bossier Chrysler-Dodge sued James
Riley for failing to deliver a pickup truck as a trade-in for a used car that
Riley allegedly had purchased.2 35 Riley counterclaimed for fraud and
DTPA violations arising from a dispute over the financing terms and
whether and when Riley could cancel the sales contract. 236 The jury
226. Id. at 472.
227. Id. at 472-73.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 472.
230. Id. at 478-79.
231. Id.
232. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)-(3) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
233. 221 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. denied).
234. Id. at 753.




found that Bossier had committed fraud and violated the DTPA and
awarded Riley damages. 2 37
Bossier appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of ac-
tionable misrepresentations or omissions. 238 Riley testified at trial that at
the time he signed the contract for the purchase of the used car, a Bossier
representative told him that financing had been approved. 239 He also tes-
tified that he was told that he could cancel the contract. 240 The Waco
Court of Appeals concluded that this evidence of misrepresentation was
legally sufficient. 241 Likewise, there was legally sufficient evidence that
Bossier knew that financing was not approved until after Riley signed the
installment contract, that Bossier failed to disclose this information, and
that Riley would not have signed the contract if he had known that fi-
nancing had not yet been approved. 242 Because there was conflicting evi-
dence regarding when financing was approved, when Riley signed the
various documents, and when Riley cancelled the contract, the court con-
cluded that it was required to defer to the jury's resolution of those issues
and that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the verdict.243
2. Section 17.50-Breach of Warranty
A DTPA claim may be based on the breach of an express or implied
warranty, although the DTPA does not itself create any warranties.2 44
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether a plaintiff's knowl-
edge of defects precludes an implied warranty claim in Haire v. Nathan
Watson Co.245 The Haires' home began having structural problems and
investigations revealed excessive swelling of the soil beneath the home
without design and construction to accommodate the swelling.246 The
Haires sued the subdivision's developer, alleging that it had a duty to
prepare the lot so that it could adequately support a home, and that pro-
viding such services gave rise to an implied warranty that the Haires' lot
would be prepared in a good and workmanlike manner. The Haires also
brought a breach of implied warranty claim against the geotechnical engi-
neering firm that, in the initial development stages of the subdivision, had
been hired to perform soil analysis to serve as a basis for the design of the
foundations of the subdivision's homes. The engineering firm success-




239. Id. at 753.
240. Id. at 754.
241. Id. at 756.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 756-57.
244. Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1995). See also TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
245. 221 S.W.3d 293(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
246. Id. at 296.
247. Id. at 297.
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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of the
engineering firm's summary judgment motion.248 The court first ex-
plained that "[o]ne of the purposes behind the implied warranty that ser-
vices be performed in a good and workmanlike manner is the protection
of the helpless consumer who takes what he gets because he does not
know enough technically to test or judge what is before him."'249 This
protection is unwarranted if the consumer is advised of the need for re-
pairs and the consequences of failing to make them.25 0 The summary
judgment evidence showed that, the Haires were aware of the potential
problems in the subdivision and in the home they were buying through
the original homeowner's disclosure, an earlier inspection, and their own
pre-purchase inspector's findings, and were on notice of the potential for
structural problems without proper maintenance and repairs.25 1 The
court concluded that this knowledge barred the Haires' claim for breach
of implied warranty.2 52
C. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A prevailing plaintiff in a DTPA action may recover economic dam-
ages. 253 In cases involving misrepresentation, the plaintiff may recover
either "out-of-pocket" or "benefit-of-the-bargain" damages. 2
54 Out-of-
pocket damages measure the difference between what the buyer paid and
the value of what he received. 255 Benefit-of-the-bargain damages mea-
sure the difference between the value of the goods or services as repre-
sented and the value as received. 256 If the trier of fact finds that the
defendant acted "knowingly," the plaintiff may also recover damages for
mental anguish and treble statutory damages.
257
1. Damages for Mental Anguish
The Texarkana Court of Appeals considered the evidence necessary to
support an award of mental anguish damages in Medical Protective Co. v.
Herrin.258 Herrin, a surgeon, sued his former malpractice carrier for re-
fusing to renew his insurance policy. 259 At trial, he sought damages for
reduced earnings and mental anguish.260 He testified that when he re-
ceived the nonrenewal notice he felt "terrible," and that the insurer's
statement that there were frequent and severe malpractice claims against
248. Id. at 303.
249. Id. at 302.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 303.
252. Id. at 302-03.
253. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
254. Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. 1984).
255. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex. 1997).
256. Id.
257. Leyendecker, 683 S.W.2d at 373.
258. 235 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, pet. denied).




him made him "tremendously upset." He further testified that following
the nonrenewal, he felt like his work was more difficult and was no longer
as pleasant as it once had been.261 Although he described himself as
somewhat suicidal, he later conceded that he was not suicidal, but merely
engaging in uncharacteristically dangerous behavior.262 There was no ev-
idence presented of the severity of his symptoms, no evidence that Her-
rin's mental anguish had harmed his physical health, no evidence that he
sought professional psychiatric assistance, and no evidence that the
mental anguish substantially disrupted Herrin's daily routine.263 The Tex-
arkana Court of Appeals therefore reversed the jury's award of mental
anguish damages, concluding that, at most, the evidence showed "mere
worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger," which was legally in-
sufficient to establish compensable mental anguish.264
2. Restitution
In Thomas v. State,265 the State of Texas, acting through the Consumer
Protection Division of the Attorney General's Office, brought suit
against Ruth C. Thomas and John W. Thomas, alleging that the defend-
ants' immigration services business violated the DTPA by engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law.266 The jury found in favor of the State and
the trial court ordered restitution from each defendant of $469,416.50,
which was the amount the jury found that each defendant had acquired
by means of engaging in an unlawful act or practice. 267 The trial court
also ordered that "the review, determination and allocations of amounts
of money to be restored to consumers shall be within the sole discretion
of the Consumer Protection and Public Health Division." 268 The
Thomases appealed, arguing that an order of restitution "without specifi-
cally identifying the persons to whom monies were to be paid or the
amount due to each recipient" and that included monies the Thomases
received more than two years prior to the filing of the lawsuit violated
section 17.47(d) of the DTPA.269
Section 17.47(d) of the DTPA provides that a court
may make such additional orders or judgments as are necessary to
compensate identifiable persons for actual damages or to restore
money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired
by means of any unlawful act or practice. Damages may not include
any damages incurred beyond a point two years prior to the institu-
tion of the action by the consumer protection division. 270
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 869-70.
264. Id.
265. 226 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007, pet. dism'd).
266. Id. at 700.
267. Id. at 706.
268. Id. at 707.
269. Id. at 700-01.
270. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47(d) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
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Addressing this issue of first impression, the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals held that the statute provides for two types of damages: (1) com-
pensation to identifiable persons for actual damages, and (2) "restoration
of money or property acquired by unlawful means. ' 271 The court con-
cluded that an award of "restoration" damages does not require "that the
trial court specify 'identifiable persons' or the amount of money to be
paid to each consumer. '272 The court also concluded that the two-year
statute of limitation applies only to an award of actual damages, and not
to a restitution award.273
D. EXEMPTIONS, DEFENSES, AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
The DTPA has been characterized as a strict liability statute, only re-
quiring proof of misrepresentation without regard to the offending
party's intent.2 74 This is only partially correct, since several DTPA provi-
sions expressly require proof of intentional conduct. 275 Some courts have
gone so far as to hold that common law defenses, such as estoppel and
ratification, are unavailable in DTPA claims.2 7 6 Other courts have recog-
nized a variety of DTPA defenses. 27 7 Additionally, both the courts and
the legislature have carved out exemptions from the DTPA's reach.
1. Exemptions Within the DTPA
Section 17.49 of the DTPA contains several exemptions from the Act's
reach. During the survey period, the Western District of Texas examined
the exemption for certain professional services in what is one of few pub-
lished opinions on the provision. Pazarin v. Armes2 78 demonstrates that
not all professionals can avoid claims under the DTPA by blind reliance
on the Act's professional services exclusion. The plaintiff Elizabeth
Pazarin, retained Jay Armes, a private investigator and security expert, to
advise and assist her in efforts to secure the release of her brother-in-law
who had been kidnapped in Tijuana, Mexico. Pazarin paid $100,000 to
271. Thomas, 226 S.W.3d at 706.
272. Id. at 707.
273. Id. at 706-11.
274. See, e.g., White Budd Van Ness P'ship v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture, 798
S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd).
275. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (17) & (24)
(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
276. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 154 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part, 981 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1998); see also Smith v.
Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (recognizing that a primary purpose of the DTPA
is to relieve consumers of the burden of overcoming common law defenses while providing
a cause of action for misrepresentation).
277. See, e.g., Ostrow v. United Bus. Machs., Inc., 982 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) ("We hold a DTPA claim arising out of a contract may be
barred by accord and satisfaction."); Johnson v. McLeaish, No. 05-94-01673-CV, 1995 WL
500308, *10 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 23, 1995, writ denied) (applying illegality/public pol-
icy affirmative defense to DTPA claims); Keriotis v. Lombardo Rental Trust, 607 S.W.2d
44, 46 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e) (applying statute of frauds to DTPA
claims).
278. 512 F. Supp. 2d 861 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
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retain Armes. Shortly thereafter, Pazarin decided to rely instead upon
the services of Mexican investigators and negotiators and requested the
return of the $100,000. Armes refused, taking the position that the
$100,000 was a non-refundable deposit. 279 Pazarin then sued, asserting,
among other things, a DTPA claim.280
Armes moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under section
17.49(c)'s "professional services" exemption. 28 1 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas disagreed, finding that the
plaintiff's claims were not based on the performance of professional ser-
vices. 282 Instead, the court concluded that because Pazarin's claims re-
lated to alleged misrepresentations regarding the $100,000 payment, the
claims did not fall within the professional services exemption.28 3 The
court accordingly denied the motion for summary judgment and allowed
Pazarin to proceed with the prosecution of her DTPA claim.28 4
2. Preemption and Exemption From the D TPA
Certain statutory schemes and common law doctrines bar either ex-
pressly or by implication DTPA claims, or affect a plaintiff's procedures
for bringing DTPA claims.
a. Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
Under the Texas medical liability law, a plaintiff bringing a "health care
liability claim" must file an expert report within 120 days after filing
suit.28 5 If no expert report is served by that time, on proper motion by
the defendant, the trial court is required to dismiss the action with
prejudice and award the defendant reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs.
28 6
The Dallas Court of Appeals examined this requirement in Lee v.
Boothe.287 Lee hired Boothe to perform an Interlasik eye procedure.
Lee alleged that during the procedure she was rushed through the pre-
operative steps, that she was not given the proper anesthetic on her eyes,
and that Boothe used excessive force on her eyes, causing intense pain.
Lee further alleged that she was in pain for several weeks following the
procedure and that her vision was not corrected to 20/20 as had been
promised. When she tried to collect on the money-back guarantee, she
was asked to sign a form releasing Boothe from liability.28 8 Lee declined
279. Id. at 863.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 864.
282. Id. at 879.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008).
286. Id. at § 74.351(b).
287. 235 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Last year's Survey re-
ported on another case against the same doctor. See Boothe v. Dixon, 180 S.W.3d 915
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
288. Lee, 235 S.W.3d at 450.
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to sign the release and sued, alleging that Boothe had violated the DTPA
by failing to fulfill the promises in his advertisements. Boothe moved for
dismissal of the DTPA claim on the ground that Lee had failed to file an
expert report within the deadline required by Texas law.2 89 The trial
court granted the motion and Lee appealed, arguing that her claim was
not a health care liability claim.2
90
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. 29 1 The court rec-
ognized that a plaintiff cannot recast a health care liability claim as a
different cause of action.292 The focus is on the "nature and essence" of
the claim, not on how the claim was pleaded.293 "If the factual allega-
tions are related to the medical treatment provided by the defendant and
constitute 'an inseparable part of [the defendant's] rendition of medical
services,' then the plaintiff's claim is a health care liability claim subject to
the requirements of chapter 74.' '294 Applying this test, the court con-
cluded that Lee's allegations were, in essence, claims of negligence be-
cause her injuries arose from the allegedly wrongful manner in which
Boothe operated on her eyes. 295 As Lee had not timely filed an expert
report, dismissal under the Texas medical liability law was proper.
296
b. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before an injured
worker may sue for damages for a workers' compensation insurance car-
rier's alleged bad faith delay or denial of medical benefits. 297 In Pickett v.
Texas Mutual Insurance Co.,298 the Austin Court of Appeals considered
the effect of this requirement on a DTPA claim. Conceding that they had
not exhausted their administrative remedies, the Pickets argued that ex-
haustion was not required for their claims for damages other than the
allegedly wrongfully denied medical benefits. 299 The court disagreed,
holding that the determination of whether a claim is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission turns not on the source of the claim (such
as common law tort or statute) but on "whether the claim is based on a
claimant's entitlement to benefits. '300 The Picketts' DTPA claims were
based on alleged denials, delays, and premature terminations of medical
treatment, and on the contention that Texas Mutual misrepresented the
289. Id.
290. Id. at 451.
291. Id. at 452.
292. Id. at 451.
293. Id. at 451-52.
294. Id. at 451 (quoting Walden v. Jeffery, 907 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. 1995)).
295. Id.
296. Lee, 235 S.W.3d at 452. The court also mentioned that under Section 74.004 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, DTPA claims for personal injuries allegedly resulting
from negligence on the part of health care providers is prohibited. Id.
297. See Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 802 (Tex. 2001).
298. 239 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.).
299. Id. at 832.
300. Id. at 835-36.
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availability of benefits.301 The court concluded that the Picketts' claims
were "predicated on the denial of benefits" and thus subject to the ex-
haustion requirement. 30 2 The court also rejected the Picketts' argument
that exhaustion was not required because they sought damages other
than denied medical benefits, relying on the holding in Fodge that a dam-
ages award "'equal to the cost of denied medical care is tantamount to
ordering that the care be paid for." 30 3
3. Necessity of Proving Causation
Liability under the DTPA is limited to conduct that is a "producing
cause" of the plaintiff's damages. 30 4 Unlike the doctrine of proximate
cause, producing cause does not require that the injury be foreseeable. 305
"Producing cause" has been defined as "an efficient, exciting, or contrib-
uting cause, which in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages
complained of."'306 When determining whether the actions complained of
are a producing cause of a plaintiff's damages, courts look to whether the
alleged cause is a substantial factor without which the injury would not
have occurred.307
In Sparks v. Booth308 the Dallas Court of Appeals considered when
misrepresentations by someone other than a homebuilder could be the
producing cause of injury arising from defects in home construction. The
Booths planned to build a house and went to a model home to obtain
information from the builders. They spoke with Johnathan Sparks, who
told them that they could choose a model home or, for a design fee of
$2,500, design their own home using the services of an architect. The
Booths paid the fee and Sparks and the Booths created a computer-gen-
erated design that Sparks said he would provide to the architect who
would prepare the plans. The design indicated the home would be built
by Covenant Builders, which was Johnathan Sparks' company.30 9 The
next day, the Booths signed a contract for $234,180 for the house. The
contract indicated that the builder would not be Covenant Builders, but
instead Sparks Heritage Homes, which was a company owned by Sparks'
father. When the Booths questioned this disparity, they were told that all
legal documents were done through Sparks Heritage Homes.310 At that
time, the Booths believed that their home would nevertheless be built by
Johnathan Sparks but at closing, Johnathan's father said that he would be
301. Id. at 836.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 836 (quoting Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 804).
304. See Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995).
305. See Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
dism'd).
306. Union Pump Co. v. Albritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995).
307. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).
308. 232 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
309. Id. at 859.
310. Id. at 859-60.
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the builder. 311
During the home's construction it became apparent that there were
many problems and that the plans had not, in fact, been prepared by an
architect. The Booths consulted with another builder, who estimated that
it would cost $350,000 to repair and complete the house. The Booths
sued Johnathan Sparks and Sparks Heritage Homes. The case was tried
to the bench, which entered judgment against the defendants.312
On appeal, Johnathan Sparks argued that there was legally insufficient
evidence to prove that his actions were the producing cause of the
Booths' damages because neither he nor his company was the builder of
the home and there was no evidence that the damages were directly re-
lated to his alleged misrepresentation. 313 The Dallas Court of Appeals
disagreed with both arguments.314 There was evidence that Johnathan
Sparks told the Booths that an architect would design the home. When
the Booths met Sparks to go over the "architectural drawing," there were
a few inaccuracies, and Johnathan and his father said they would send the
drawings back to the architect. 315 There was also evidence that no archi-
tect was ever hired and that, although the Sparks used the term "archi-
tect," they in fact regularly used a design company. 316 The court held
that although the Booths' contract was with Sparks Heritage Homes,
Johnathan Sparks represented to the Booths that an architect would de-
sign the house and the defects in the house resulted from inadequate
plans. The court concluded that this was legally sufficient evidence to
prove that Johnathan Sparks was the producing cause of the Booths'
damages. 317
4. Necessity of Proving Reliance
To recover under section 17.50 of the DTPA for a "laundry list" viola-
tion, a consumer must prove that the "false, misleading, or deceptive act
or practice" was a producing cause of damages and that the consumer
relied upon the act or practice. 318 In Kupchynsky v. Nardiello,319
homebuyers sued a builder in connection with construction defects in the
house. During the pre-sale inspections, an inspector found water on the
tile of a balcony. The buyers discussed the problem with the builder and
installer, who assured them that the water was to be expected based upon
the design and construction of the balconies. The buyers accepted this
explanation and, after renegotiating the sales price to cover unrelated
problems, purchased the house. Five months later, the balconies began to
311. Id. at 860.
312. Id. at 860-61.
313. Id. at 864.
314. Id. at 860.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 864-65.
317. Id. at 865.
318. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
319. 230 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied).
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leak. Construction experts found numerous problems with the balconies'
construction and concluded that the home was not built in a good and
workmanlike manner. The builder refused to pay for the necessary re-
pairs, the buyers sued, and a jury awarded the buyers $52,695 in
damages. 320
On appeal, the builder argued that as a matter of law, the homebuyers'
inspections of the house, and related renegotiation of the sales contract,
precluded reliance. 321 In doing so, they cited Dubow v. Dragon,322 which
held that a buyer's careful inspection of a house's condition "constituted
a new and independent basis for the purchase which intervened and su-
perseded the [sellers'] alleged wrongful act. '323 The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals rejected the builder's argument, holding that the outcome in
Dubow did not turn solely on the buyer-purchased independent inspec-
tion but also on their reliance on the inspector's opinions to renegotiate
the sales contract.324 In contrast, the homebuyers in the present case re-
lied on not just the inspectors' findings but on representations by the
builder. Moreover, while the contract was renegotiated based upon de-
fects identified in the inspections, the balcony drainage system was not
part of the renegotiation. 325 The court concluded that given the distinct
circumstances, Dubow did not preclude the buyers' recovery.326
In re Riviera327 is another 2007 case that hinged on whether the plain-
tiffs could establish reliance upon the misrepresentations underlying the
DTPA claims. The Rivieras, who had sought bankruptcy protection, initi-
ated an adversary proceeding against Texas State Bank claiming that the
bank misrepresented the terms of a loan made to the Rivieras. Specifi-
cally, the Rivieras complained that the bank made them a commercial
loan rather than a residential loan to secure financing on a property that
the Rivieras intended to use for both business and homestead pur-
poses.328 Texas State Bank filed a motion to dismiss the claims, including
the DTPA claim.329
In reviewing the materials presented to it, the bankruptcy court noted
that in responding to the motion, the Rivieras offered no evidence of reli-
ance upon the alleged misrepresentations. To the contrary, the Rivieras
alleged that they failed to learn of the alleged misrepresentations until
after the adversary proceeding was initiated.330 As the Rivieras' DTPA
claims were all laundry list claims that require reliance on a misrepresen-
tation, the court granted the Bank's motion and dismissed the DTPA
320. Id. at 686-87.
321. Id. at 688.
322. 746 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
323. Id. at 860.
324. Id. at 689.
325. Id.
326. Nardiello, 230 S.W.3d at 689.
327. 358 B.R. 688 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007).
328. Id. at 691.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 691-92.
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claims.331
5. "As Is" Clauses
An "as is" agreement generally negates the causation element of a
DTPA claim.332 The Texas Supreme Court considered such a clause in
Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider.333 Gym-N-I leased a building from
Snider, and agreed in the lease to accept the building "as is." The parties
operated under the lease during its original term. Although the lease was
never renewed, after the expiration of the original term Gym-N-I occu-
pied the premises on a month-to-month tenancy. During this hold-over
period, the building was destroyed by a fire.334 Gym-N-I sued Snider,
asserting various claims relating to the condition of the building.335 The
trial court granted Snider's motion for summary judgment, and Gym-N-I
appealed. 336 The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed and Gym-N-I sought
review in the Texas Supreme Court, arguing that the "as is" clause could
not be enforced after the lease's original term and that the clause did not
negate the reliance element of its DTPA claim. 337
The Texas Supreme Court first rejected Gym-N-I's argument that the
"as is" provision did not survive the expiration of the lease's original
term. 338 The parties' lease expressly provided that "[any holding over
without written consent of Landlord shall constitute a lease from month-
to-month, under the terms and provisions of this Lease to the extent ap-
plicable to a tenancy from month-to-month. '339 The supreme court con-
cluded that the phrase "under the terms and provisions of this Lease"
meant that the lease governed the month-to-month tenancy and thus the
as-is clause was in effect when the fire occurred.340
Turning to the application of the as-is clause, which required Gym-N-I
to accept the premises "as is" and stated that Snider "has not made and
does not make any representations as to the commercial suitability, physi-
cal condition, layout, footage, expenses, operation or any other matter
affecting or relating to the premises," the supreme court held that Gym-
N-I had "contractually disavowed any reliance upon any representation
by Snider."'341 The as-is clause thus negated Gym-N-I's claim that
Snider's actions caused it injury.342
331. Id.
332. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).
333. 220 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. 2007). The lower court decision, Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc.
v. Snider, 158 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. granted), was discussed in the Sum-
mer 2007 Survey.
334. Snider, 220 S.W.3d at 906-07.
335. Id. at 907-08.




340. Id. at 908-09.
341. Id. at 914.
342. Id.
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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether a third party to a
contract may enforce an as-is clause in Haire v. Nathan Watson Co., dis-
cussed above. 343 The Haires purchased their home from a relocation ser-
vice under a contract bearing an as-is clause. The home began having
structural problems and investigations revealed faulty design and con-
struction. The Haires sued the subdivision's developer and a consulting
engineering firm. 344 Both defendants moved for summary judgment on
the ground that the as-is clause in the Haires' contract precluded a DTPA
claim. The trial court granted summary judgment on this ground but the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed. 3
45
The court acknowledged that the Haires were bound by their agree-
ment but held that neither the developer nor the engineering firm could
rely on that agreement.346 Neither defendant had identified any caselaw
for the proposition that outsiders to a contract are protected by an as-is
clause. The court also rejected the defendants' argument that they were
third-party beneficiaries of the sales contract. 347 Quoting Loyd v. ECO
Resource, Inc.,348 the court held that "[tihe fact that a person is directly
affected by the parties' conduct, or that he 'may have a substantial inter-
est' in a contract's enforcement, does not make him a third-party benefi-
ciary."' 349 For this reason, parties are presumed to contract for
themselves alone unless it "clearly appears" that they intended to benefit
a third party.350 Applying these principles to the evidence, the court held
that there was no evidence that the Haires' contract was intended to ben-
efit the subdivision's developer or engineer.351 Because the defendants
were neither parties to nor third-party beneficiaries of the contract, the
court held that the defendants could not rely on the "as is" provision of
the contract.352
In Kupchynsky v. Nardiello,353 discussed above, homebuyers sued a
builder for defects in a house. On appeal from a jury verdict in favor of
the homebuyers, the builder argued that under the holding in Prudential
Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd.,354 the "as is" pro-
vision in the contract negated causation as a matter of law.355 The Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the buyers were not bound by the "as is"
clause because under the Prudential holding, such clauses are not binding
if (1) the buyer was induced to make the contract by a fraudulent repre-
sentation or concealment of information by the seller or (2) the "nature
343. 221 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
344. Id. at 296-97.
345. Id. at 297.
346. Id. at 300.
347. Id. at 301.
348. 956 S.W.2d 110, 134 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).
349. Haire, 221 S.W.3d at 301.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 301.
353. 230 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied).
354. 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
355. Nardiello, 230 S.W.3d at 695.
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of the transaction and totality of the circumstances surrounding the
agreement" render enforcement of the "as is" clause unjust.3 56 The court
concluded that because the "as is" clause in question was contained in a
form contract, was neither discussed nor negotiated, and unlike the clause
in Prudential, did not expressly address latent defects, it was not an "'im-
portant basis of the bargain' that negated causation as a matter of
law."357
6. A Mere Breach of Contract is Not Actionable Under the DTPA
A breach of contract unaccompanied by a misrepresentation or fraud is
not a false, misleading or deceptive act and thus does not violate the
DTPA. 358 In Bossier Chrysler-Dodge II, Inc. v. Riley,35 9 discussed above,
Bossier argued that Riley's DTPA claims regarding misrepresentations of
Riley's right to cancel the contract and the timing of Riley's financing
approval were not actionable because these were merely contract
claims.360 The Waco Court of Appeals held that it was required to con-
sider "the totality of the circumstances surrounding the parties' dealings
... taking in consideration all relevant factors" including (1) whether the
representation was factual, interpretive, or some combination; (2)
whether the relevant contractual language was ambiguous; (3) whether
the parties were in a substantially equal position of knowledge and infor-
mation; (4) whether there was evidence of overreaching; (5) whether
there was evidence of unconscionable conduct; and (6) whether the par-
ties were in a confidential or fiduciary relationship. 361 Applying this stan-
dard to the facts before it, the court held that Bossier's alleged
representation regarding Riley's right to cancel was "clearly interpre-
tive," that a reasonable jury could infer that Bossier was in a superior
position of knowledge and information, and that there was evidence of
unconscionable conduct. 362 Based upon these factors, the court con-
cluded that Riley's claims did not seek recovery for a mere breach of
contract and therefore were actionable under the DTPA.363
IV. CONCLUSION
The past year was a busy one for antitrust law in the United States
Supreme Court. This is not to say that it was a good one for antitrust
plaintiffs. Of the four cases reported in this Survey, the plaintiffs lost
356. Id. at 690.
357. Id. at 690-91 (quoting Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 162). The court also acknowl-
edged the builder's alleged misrepresentation and concealment of facts regarding the bal-
conies. Nardiello, 230 S.W.3d at 691.
358. Ashford Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Serv. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex.
1983); Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
denied).
359. 221 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. denied).
360. Id. at 755.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 756.
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them all. Perhaps more interesting is how the plaintiffs lost. Two of the
four decisions, Leegin and Twombly, involved overruling a total of 146
years of Supreme Court precedent, while another, Credit Suisse, granted
blanket immunity to underwriters of IPOs from the antitrust laws despite
the urgings of the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice that
such broad immunity was unnecessary.
Leegin and Twombly represent an erosion of traditional principles gov-
erning the deference to stare decisis. As Justice Breyer noted in his
Leegin dissent, the arguments advanced in support of overruling Dr.
Miles were neither new nor compelling. 364 Justice Stevens made a similar
point in his Twombly dissent: Conley's "no set of facts" standard has been
cited with approval in sixteen Supreme Court opinions, followed by innu-
merable lower federal courts, and embraced by the courts of at least
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia. 365 Indeed, before
Twombly, no member of the Supreme Court had expressed any reserva-
tions about the Conley test and neither the petitioner nor the six amici
who submitted briefs asked that it be overruled. 366 One might be for-
given for noting the resemblance of this disposition to the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Coca Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co.367 As reported
in last year's Survey, the Coca-Cola court ruled for the antitrust defend-
ants on grounds never raised by any party in the trial court, in the court
of appeals, or in the supreme court itself.368
Credit Suisse does not represent such an explicit break with precedent.
It is, however, noteworthy for finding the securities laws as implicitly pre-
cluding application of the antitrust laws to the conduct alleged. Although
the Supreme Court's opinion framed the salient question as "whether
there is a 'plain repugnancy'"369 between the plaintiffs' antitrust claims
and the federal securities laws, its finding of a "plain repugnancy" rested
on no actual conflict between antitrust and securities law. 370 Indeed, the
majority's opinion acknowledged the fact that "the SEC has disapproved
[(and, for argument's sake, we assume it will continue to disapprove)] the
conduct that the antitrust complaints attack. ' 371 Rather, the Supreme
Court found a "plain repugnancy" between antitrust law and securities
law because "only a fine, complex, detailed line" separates activity the
SEC encourages from activity the SEC forbids, and "who but a securities
expert could say whether the present SEC rules set forth a virtually per-
364. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2732-34 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
365. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1978 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 1978-79.
367. 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006).
368. See A. Michael Ferrill, Leslie Sara Hyman & William "Butch" Hulse, Antitrust and
Consumer Protection 60 SMU L. REV. 669, 708 (2007).
369. Credit Suisse Sec. LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2387 (2007) (quoting Gordon v.
NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975)).
370. Id. at 2387.
371. Id. at 2394.
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manent line" between the two? 372 To this the Court added the concern
that nonexpert judges and juries across the country might reach differing
results.
Of course, the use of experts to assist a court in "line-drawing" is not
foreign to antitrust litigation, nor is the risk that judges and juries across
the country might reach differing results on the same or similar facts.
One may assume this true of any litigation. And however pressing these
concerns might be, it is doubtful that they establish "plain repugnancy"
between the antitrust and securities laws. Indeed, one might fairly con-
clude that the proposition is self-refuting. After all, if the line is so diffi-
cult to find, what could be clear about it? Rather, as Justice Stevens
noted in Credit Suisse, the majority's opinion in Twombly stands for a
quite different proposition, namely, that some antitrust complaints are
too complicated to be entrusted to judges and juries. Justice Stevens cat-
egorically rejected this proposition:
Surely I would not suggest, as the Court did in Twombly, and as it
does again today, that either the burdens of antitrust litigation or the
risk "that antitrust courts are likely to make unusually serious mis-
takes" should play any role in the analysis of the question of law
presented in a case such as this.37 3
In contradistinction to the Credit Suisse Court, the Leegin majority
abandoned Dr. Miles' bright-line rule of per se illegality in favor of case-
by-case "line-drawing" under the rule of reason. 374 The majority ex-
plained that "[a]s courts gain experience considering the effects of these
restraints by applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions, they
can establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to elimi-
nate anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more gui-
dance to businesses. '375
One might reasonably ask why this kind of case-by-case line-drawing,
aided by experts, is suitable for exploring the supposed vagaries of verti-
cal price-fixing, yet is so unsuited to a purely hypothetical conflict be-
tween antitrust and securities laws. Credit Suisse notwithstanding, it is at
least debatable whether recent experience demonstrates that the SEC's
regulatory oversight is sufficient to police manipulation in the securities
markets, much less identify and remedy anticompetitive activity. As Pro-
fessor Einer Elhauge has observed,
[g]iven the extent of modern federal regulation, it may well be the
case that, in most of our economy, some agency has exercised power
to regulate some conduct that might also constitute an antitrust vio-
lation. If all such conduct were exempt from antitrust scrutiny, there
could well be little left to the antitrust laws.376
372. Id. at 2395.
373. Id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
374. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007).
375. Id. at 2720.
376. E. Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent Supreme
Court Decisions?, COMPETrION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2007, at 58, 74.
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With apologies to Justice Stewart,3 77 one thing that can be said with
certainty about the Supreme Court's recent antitrust decisions is that the
defendant always wins. As Professor Elhauge has noted, over the past
fourteen years, the Supreme Court has decided fourteen antitrust cases,
and the plaintiffs have lost them all.378 Here also one finds a parallel with
the Texas Supreme Court, which is enjoying a twenty-five-year unbroken
record of never once siding with an antitrust plaintiff.379
If, as Justice Stevens suggests, the Credit Suisse and Twombly decisions
are based on concerns over "the burdens of antitrust litigation or the risk
'that antitrust courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes,"' 380
one might be forgiven for asking whether, in the quest for avoiding false
positives, it is good policy to allow "lawyers' debates over economic the-
ory to conclusively resolve antitrust suits in the absence of any evi-
dence. '' 381 Absent equivalent solicitude for the avoidance of false
negatives, the deterrence benefits of antitrust enforcement are compro-
mised and, in the argot of antitrust economics, judicial resources are inef-
ficiently utilized.
377. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting ("[Tihe sole consistency [in merger law] . . . is that . . . the government always
wins.").
378. See Elhauge, supra note 376, at 14 ("Since 1994, every Supreme Court antitrust
case has been consistent with the rule that the antitrust defendant always wins.").
379. See Ferrill et al., supra note 368, at 711.
380. Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2398 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
381. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1988 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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